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*C.J.Q. 224 This article examines access to the European Court of Justice under Art.230 EC, relating
to judicial review, and submits that the approach to locus standi for natural and legal persons under
that article is both inconsistent and inappropriate. It is argued that other avenues of redress are often
limited, the European Court of Justice has contradicted its own jurisprudence from other areas, the
judicial review process has the potential to reduce the Community's democratic deficit, the
jurisprudence is out of step with that of Member States and the approach contravenes rights
protected by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. The article concludes with
proposals for reform of Art.230 EC.
Introduction
Access to justice is an essential right in a society based on the rule of law,1 and adequate redress for
unlawful state action must be available if government itself is to be subject to this. However, most
societies commonly accept restrictions on the right to challenge action or inaction by the state in the
interests, for example, of deterring frivolous claims or of ensuring legislative freedom. At EU level, the
balance has been struck by permitting challenges to Community law to be brought in the Community
courts, but restricting the standing of some potential applicants to bring such actions.
*C.J.Q. 225 This article argues that the approach to standing of natural and legal persons under
Art.230 EC adopted by the Court of Justice is both inconsistent and inappropriate. This, it is
submitted, emerges from a number of distinct analyses which will be made after explaining the
current law on standing. First, an applicant faced with restrictions on its rights under Art.230 EC is
equally likely to find other avenues of redress closed, yet the court has failed to address the impact of
its approach to standing in this wider context. Secondly, the court appears to have neglected the
reasoning behind some of its own jurisprudence imposing obligations on Member States and adopting
liberal views on access to Community law in national courts. Thirdly, the restrictions on standing
increase the democratic deficit which has plagued the Community since its inception. Fourthly, they
are less generous than the approach to judicial review adopted by many of the Member States.
Finally, the restrictions are contrary to the right to a fair trial in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of
the European Union.
This article argues that these criticisms mandate a new approach to standing and concludes with
proposals for this.
The standing of natural and legal persons under Art.230 EC
Article 230 EC, which sets out the rules governing judicial review of Community measures, provides
not only the grounds of claim, but also the requirements which must be met if the claim is to be
admissible. These requirements as to locus standi vary according to the type of applicant. Article
230(4) EC provides that legal and natural persons (“non-privileged applicants”) may apply only for the
annulment of decisions addressed to them, and decisions, or decisions in the form of regulations,
which are of direct and individual concern to them.2 The Community courts have also held that
nonprivileged applicants may challenge directives, on the ground that the Community institutions
should not be able, through their choice of legislative instrument, to deprive such applicants of the
possibility of challenge.3 However, this is limited to directives which are of direct and individual
concern to the applicants.
Page1
Member States, the Council, the Commission and the European Parliament (“privileged applicants”),
and the Court of Auditors and the European Central Bank (the “intermediate” category of applicants),
may challenge the legality of any form of Community legislation except secondary legislation adopted
*C.J.Q. 226 under Title IV EC (asylum and immigration).4 However, the possibility of challenge by
privileged or intermediate applicants does not provide additional protection for non-privileged
applicants, since the latter cannot compel the former to bring a challenge. Indeed, Art.230 EC
provides that intermediate applicants may bring challenges only for the purpose of protecting their
prerogatives. Organisations which lack legal personality, and which therefore have no standing at all,
are in an even weaker position.
The reason underlying these restrictions is, of course, the desire to avoid a flood of claims which
could swamp the Community courts and produce uncertainty in the law. This underlies not only the
original drafting of Art.230(4) EC but also the persistent failure of the Member States in later Treaties
to amend it. The provisions of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe do contain
amendments (see below) but these are relatively minor and largely preserve the restricted grant of
locus standi.
It is thus evident that the courts' interpretation of the preconditions of direct and individual concern,
and of the requirement that a regulation be in name or substance a decision, is crucial to
non-privileged applicants' access to justice, and will now be examined in more detail.
Direct concern
The Court of Justice has held that a non-privileged applicant may only contest a measure which
impacts upon it directly, either because the measure leaves no discretion to the Member State
authorities responsible for implementing it,5 or because the authorities have indicated, prior to the
adoption of the measure, how any discretion will be exercised.6 The court has mitigated the
harshness of this rule by accepting as sufficient indication not only express statements, but also
behaviour which makes plain the intentions of the authorities.7 However, this liberality is limited since,
if any discretion remains when the measure is adopted, the action will be inadmissible for lack of
direct concern.8 The other indicator of the court's liberality in this area, its extension of standing to
challenges to directives, has therefore been of little benefit in practice. It is virtually impossible for a
directive to be of direct concern to an applicant, since directives are addressed to Member States
and, by their very nature, leave those states some discretion in implementation.
It is true that where the existence of discretion prevents an action under Art.230 EC, the Member
State's subsequent acts, which will directly impact upon the applicant, may be challenged in the
national courts. However, the state may be able to argue that its action is within both the parameters
of the Community measure and the standards required by judicial review at national level. Although
the applicant could then plead the illegality of the Community *C.J.Q. 227 measure by way of
reference to the Court of Justice under Art.234 EC, this is subject to a number of difficulties,
discussed further below. It is therefore submitted not only that the court's interpretation of direct
concern unduly restricts access to justice, but that it is not ameliorated by alternative methods of
redress.
Individual concern
The Court of Justice has interpreted individual concern as meaning that the measure must, in some
way, differentiate the applicant from all others.9 The applicant may be part of a closed class, that is to
say, the group of potential applicants concerned by the measure is fixed and ascertainable at the time
the contested measure is adopted.10 The difficulty with this is that most measures are applicable for a
definite or indefinite future period, and thus the group of potential applicants is neither fixed nor
ascertainable at the date the measure is passed. The court has mitigated the harshness of this rule
by accepting that the applicant may be differentiated on the facts in some other way.11 For example,
in Codornui v Council, 12 a Spanish wine-producer was permitted to challenge a regulation which
reserved use of the term “crémant” to certain wines from France and Luxembourg because it had
registered the term in 1924 and traditionally used it before and after registration, and was therefore
affected by the regulation to a greater extent than other producers.13 This approach is used most
successfully in the areas of anti-dumping (by complainants, producers, exporters and importers),14
competition (by complainants and those expressly entitled to be heard during the investigative
procedure)15 and state aids (by complainants),16 and has been recognised by the Member States in
the proposals in the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe outlined below.
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However, it is submitted that again this liberality is limited. First, the Court of Justice has not applied
this approach consistently.17 Secondly, it remains necessary to assess the impact of the measure on
the applicant by comparison with its potential for impact on others. This particularly restricts
challenges to directives or regulations, since they are general rather than specific in nature; and it is
submitted that a potential applicant who is affected significantly should be able to bring a challenge,
regardless of whether others are, or could be, affected.
*C.J.Q. 228 Measures which are true decisions
Article 230 EC provides that regulations may only be challenged by a nonprivileged applicant if they
are in fact decisions in the form of regulations. The Court of Justice has held that this requires that the
measure be either of specific rather than general application and thus in substance a decision, or of
individual concern to the applicant and thus a decision in his regard.18
However, regulations are unlikely to be of specific application since, according to Art.249 EC, they
have general application. Nor are they likely to be of individual concern to an applicant while the test
for individual concern remains subject to the restrictive interpretation outlined above. In Unión de
Pequeños Agricultores v Council (UPA ),19 the Court of Justice rejected the arguments (discussed
below) of Advocate General Jacobs in that case,20 and of the Court of First Instance in Jégo Quéré &
Cie SA v Commission, 21 for a more generous approach and confirmed that Unión de Pequeños
Agricultores, a trade association representing small agricultural businesses in Spain, had no locus
standi to challenge a regulation which reformed the system of aid for olive oil. The regulation was, by
its nature and scope, legislative in character and therefore not a decision within the meaning of
Art.249 EC. Although it could still be of individual concern to UPA, and thus a decision regarding it,
none of the circumstances in which associations had been held to be individually concerned existed
on the facts.
The provisions of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe
Article III-270, which will replace Art.230 EC if the Treaty comes into force, provides that a
non-privileged applicant may, as at present, challenge an act addressed to it. However, the two other
possibilities of challenge by such applicants provided by Art.III-270 are different. First, an applicant
may challenge (any) act which is of direct and individual concern to it, rather than only decisions and
regulations in the form of decisions. Proposals for the current cumulative test of direct and individual
concern to be made alternative were, however, rejected.22 Secondly, such an applicant may challenge
a regulatory act which is of direct concern to it and does not entail implementing measures. The
requirement of an absence of implementing measures is intended to restrict locus standi to cases
where the individual is unable to contest national implementing measures,23 and the term “regulatory
act” was chosen in preference to “an act of general application” in order to restrict standing to
regulatory rather than legislative acts. A further change introduced by Art.III- *C.J.Q. 229 270 is that
acts of bodies, offices and agencies of the EU may be challenged, in addition to acts of the
institutions.
It is evident from this analysis that the court's interpretation of the standing rules in Art.230 EC, which
in respect of legislative acts would be little changed by the Treaty establishing a Constitution for
Europe, is open to criticism even within the terms of that Article. However, the criticism becomes even
more cogent when viewed in the context of other factors, to which this article will now turn.
Other avenues of redress against the Community
The Court of Justice in UPA 24 and Jégo-Quéré 25 argued that Arts 230, 234 and 241 EC constituted a
complete system of legal remedies ensuring effective judicial review. However, it is submitted that this
is not so. As Advocate General Jacobs in UPA 26 and Jégo-Quéré 27 and the Court of First Instance in
Jégo-Quéré 28 noted, where natural or legal persons are unable to use Art.230 EC to challenge a
measure directly, they might also be unable to do so indirectly by pleading its invalidity before the
before the Community courts under Art.241 EC or Art.288 EC, or before a national court with a
request for a reference under Art.234 EC.29 This is in part a result of the court's restrictive
interpretation of these Treaty articles, and it is submitted that when interpreting Art.230 EC the court
should have taken account of the restrictions explicit in the Treaty and those which it has implied.
Article 241 EC
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Article 241 EC provides that in proceedings where a regulation is at issue, the grounds of challenge in
Art.230 EC may be relied upon by the applicant to allege that the regulation is inapplicable. It is
submitted that this provision is, however, no substitute for a more generous interpretation of Art.230
EC. First, Art.241 EC is not an independent action and therefore the applicant must have some other
cause of action in order to utilise it. Secondly, the result is a ruling of inapplicability in the
proceedings, rather than that the measure is void.
Article 234 EC
The Court of First Instance in Jégo-Quéré and Advocate General Jacobs in UPA both criticised
Art.234 EC as a method for an individual to obtain a declaration that a Community measure was
unlawful. First, national courts are not competent to declare Community law invalid.30 Secondly, an
applicant has no *C.J.Q. 230 right to decide whether a reference is made, or which measures are
referred and on what grounds.31 Thirdly, it might be necessary for an applicant to breach the
implementing measures in order to challenge the resulting sanctions or, in the absence of
implementing measures (as in Jégo-Quéré ), to breach the Community law and then assert its
illegality in proceedings against it. In either event, individuals should not be required to breach the law
in order to gain access to justice.32 Fourthly, a reference under Art.234 EC has a number of
procedural disadvantages compared to Art.230 EC, such as substantial delays.33 In the interests of
legal certainty, a measure should be reviewable as soon as possible and not only when implementing
measures have been adopted. Indeed, the importance of legal certainty in this context is emphasised
by the two-month time limit applicable to actions under Art.230 EC.34 Fifthly, the granting of interim
measures by the national courts, for example suspending a national measure based on the contested
Community law, might detract from the uniform application of Community law.35 Sixthly, parties with a
sufficient interest can intervene in Art.230 EC proceedings, whereas under Art.234 EC that right is
restricted to Member States, Community institutions and those who have intervened in the national
proceedings.36 In addition, Art.234 EC jurisdiction under Title IV EC is limited to references from final
courts and, in all cases, the normal criteria for Art.234 EC references must be established;37 the
underlying dispute must be genuine,38 the factual and legal context must be established,39 and a
ruling on the question must be necessary to the resolution of the dispute.40
In UPA the Court of Justice considered, but rejected, the possibility of adopting a more generous
approach to locus standi in those cases in which Art.234 EC could not provide a remedy.41 Its
argument that such an approach would ignore the express requirement in Art.230 EC of individual
concern is refuted below. However, its argument that the Community courts could not reliably identify
such cases, because they have no jurisdiction to interpret and apply national procedural law, has
considerable force. It is submitted that the logical conclusion of this argument, when taken with the
criticisms of Art.234 *C.J.Q. 231 EC outlined above, is that the court must adopt a more generous
approach to locus standi for all cases involving non-privileged applicants.
Article 288 EC
There are two distinct problems with the use of Art.288 EC as an alternative to Art.230 EC. First, as
the Court of First Instance42 and Advocate General Jacobs43 recognised in Jégo-Quéré, it is different
in nature. An Art.288 EC action cannot produce an equivalent solution to Art.230 EC because it does
not enable the courts to review all the factors affecting the legality of a measure and cannot result in
the annulment of the measure held to be unlawful.
Secondly, although Art.288 EC has no formal locus standi requirements, it is submitted that the
substantive conditions implied into it by the court are not significantly easier for an applicant to satisfy
than the locus standi rules under Art.230 EC. Article 288 EC provides that the Community is liable
according to “the general principles common to the laws of the Member States” for damage caused
by its institutions or servants. The court has interpreted this as requiring proof of damage, causation
and a wrongful act,44 and has imposed additional conditions in relation to wrongful acts which involve
the exercise of legislative discretion in areas of economic policy. In these cases--which are by far the
majority of all Art.288 EC cases--the applicant must prove that the act constitutes not just a breach of
Community law, but a “sufficiently serious” breach.45 As a result, there are few successful claims
under Art.288 EC, and its usefulness is therefore limited.
The Court of Justice's jurisprudence on redress against the Member States
The approach of the Court of Justice to the question of individual access to Community law in
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domestic courts demonstrates a markedly different attitude to its approach to direct actions under
Art.230 EC. The court concluded its judgment in UPA by noting that an alternative system for judicial
review could be adopted, but that it was for the Member States to do this by Treaty amendment.46
While it is true that such amendments are a matter for the Member States, this argument is somewhat
disingenuous given that the court has developed a number of doctrines unsupported by an express
Treaty base, in order to promote and protect Community law against private parties and Member
States. It has consistently sought to facilitate individual access to Community law, for example, by
creating the concepts of direct and indirect *C.J.Q. 232 effect and Member State liability, not on the
basis of the EC Treaty,47 but on the basis of the superiority and need for effectiveness of Community
law.48
It is submitted that this divergence in approach is inappropriate. In asserting the superiority of
Community law over domestic law, the Court of Justice was able to point only to the “terms and spirit
of the Treaty” as making it impossible for Member States “to cause to prevail, against a legal order
which they themselves have accepted on conditions of reciprocity, a subsequent unilateral provision,
which cannot therefore affect the common order.”49 It extended this, without any further Treaty basis,
to rule in R. v Secretary of State for Transport Ex p. Factortame Ltd 50 that national law must be
disapplied pending a ruling on its compatibility with Community law, in order to ensure access to
justice for individuals.
The idea that individuals might be able to rely on a Treaty measure directly in a domestic court,
despite the absence of national implementation, is similarly unsupported by any explicit Treaty
measure. Instead, in introducing the concept of direct effect in Van Gend en Loos, the court relied
upon the preamble to the Treaty to provide its justification for the inception of the principle of direct
effect. It concluded that:
“Community law therefore not only imposes obligations on individuals but is also intended to confer
upon them rights which become part of their legal heritage. These rights arise not only where
expressly granted by the Treaty, but also by reason of obligations which the Treaty imposes in a
clearly defined way upon individuals as well as upon the Member States and upon the institutions of
the Community.”51
The court did not confine itself to Treaty articles as the fabric for its new creation, but expanded its
raw materials to include, perhaps most surprisingly, directives. It ruled in Van Duyn v Home Office 52
that directives could have direct effect. However, Art.249 EC clearly differentiates directives, which
are binding only as to effect, from regulations, which are directly applicable. It is submitted, therefore,
that the court was stretching its reasoning to the limit in making this attribution to directives. Article
249 EC states that a directive sets out objectives for the Member States to achieve, and this does not
suggest that its function is to create an express route to the domestic courts. That the court has
stopped short of allowing directives to have horizontal direct effect suggests that the direct effect
doctrine is intended as an enforcement weapon against Member States, rather than a technique for
increased individual access to the law. Certainly, this restriction reduces the usefulness of direct
effect as a tool of *C.J.Q. 233 democratic legitimacy (see below).53 The argument put forward by the
court, that the effectiveness of directives would be hindered were individuals denied access in their
domestic courts, is persuasive, but reliance on this in the absence of explicit references in the Treaty
itself is inconsistent with the court's approach to Art.230 EC. Indeed, it is noteworthy that an Advocate
General of the Court of Justice has highlighted the development of the principle of direct effect as the
primary underpinning principle of individual rights in the Community, whilst Art.230 EC passes without
mention in this respect.54
The development of the doctrine of indirect effect is perhaps less inconsistent, since the duty of
Member States under Art.10 EC to take all measures necessary to ensure the fulfilment of their
Treaty obligations is clearly apt to include a duty on Member States to interpret national law
consistently with Community law. In addition, the restrictive approach post-Marleasing 55 has limited
the duty to cases where this interpretation is not obviously inconsistent with domestic law.
However, Member State liability provides a further example of judicial creativity, with the court relying
on Art.10 EC to create a duty to make good damage caused by a Member State's failure to meet its
Community law obligations.56 Yet the lack of an express Treaty provision for such an action is unlikely
to be accidental given the explicit provision for Community liability in damages under Art.288 EC.
It is submitted that it is inconsistent for the court to establish new jurisprudential tools such as direct
effect, indirect effect and Member State liability in the absence of an explicit Treaty basis, while
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refusing, not to disapply the concept of individual concern, but merely to broaden its interpretation. Its
statements in UPA 57 and Jégo Quéré 58 that adherence to the principle of effective judicial protection
could not have the effect of setting aside an express Treaty provision are therefore as disingenuous
as they are irrelevant. It is also curious that the court has felt unable to utilise the Community's
express obligation under Art.5 EC to act within the powers conferred upon it in the Treaty, in order to
further develop Art.230 EC, in the same way as it has used Art.10 EC. These inconsistencies have
been acknowledged by a member of the Court of Justice, in contrasting the “straight line” running
between Plaumann and UPA with the initial “daring” of the court's case law.59
*C.J.Q. 234 The role of Art.230 EC in the democratic deficit within the Community
It is not only in relation to the Art.230 EC process that the individual is largely excluded from input into
the Community's decision-making processes. Almost from its inception, the Community has been
dogged by accusations of the existence of a “democratic deficit” brought about by its institutional
arrangements, under which the citizen's connection to the decision-making processes of the
Community is severely limited.
The legislative deficit
The Parliament is the only direct connection between the populace of the Community and its
legislative processes, and even it is not necessarily a guarantee of effective representation. Though
its influence has grown substantially through increased application of the co-decision procedure60 and
enhanced oversight of the Commission,61 its participation in many areas is still limited to consultation
or other processes where its will can effectively be overridden by a determined Council.
The Council itself has emerged as the most likely rival to the Parliament for the position of democratic
representative, since Member States may claim to be acting on behalf of their citizens when
exercising their voting rights in the Council. However, Member State governments are unlikely to be
ousted from power because of Community policy, given the plethora of issues influencing voting in
domestic elections.
The European Commission's claims to democratic legitimacy are yet weaker. Although
Commissioners are appointed by Member States, they act independently rather than representatively,
which may cast doubt on their responsiveness to the citizenry. Although the Commission is
theoretically accountable to the electorate through the scrutiny exercised by the Parliament, there is
no evidence that it is regarded as such by the ordinary citizen, and indeed serious questions exist
over its fiscal accountability.62
Though the perception of these institutional roles has been criticised as being simplistic,63 it is evident
from this that the distance, both geographical and legislative, between the citizen and the Community
institutions may readily prevent citizens from engaging in the decision-making process.64 *C.J.Q. 235
Interest group theory suggests that parties such as the Member States, involved in a regulatory
structure such as the Community, will operate to further their own best interests rather than serve the
“public interest”.65 Historically, dominant actors are unlikely to relinquish positions of strength outwith
the exertion of irresistible external pressure.66 It is thus natural that Member State Governments,
which created and evolved the Community, wish to maintain a firm hand on its legislative tiller,
particularly in the face of accusations of cession of national sovereignty to the Community.
This state of affairs is not necessarily inappropriate.67 The expectation that the Community should
simply assume the democratic characteristics of a large nation state is out of step with contemporary
thinking on the question of constitutionalism,68 which recognises the need to develop new structures
to meet the demands of globalisation.
If the legislative deficit remains, the question that then arises is how the Community might develop
other means of establishing a connection with its citizens and providing them with adequate access to
the decision-making process. This may be addressed through the development of new approaches to
the legislative process and, indeed, much has been made of the development of, and the shift away
from, the Community's “classic” legislative methods.69 This has occurred, first, through increased
recourse to framework directives, allowing greater discretion in relation to implementation by Member
States. Secondly, expert committees have been utilised to a greater extent. Thirdly, the Community
has chosen to involve civil actors more in the decision-making process.70 However, it is submitted that
these developments themselves have made only a limited impact on the democratic deficit. The
greater discretion given to Member States may increase accountability at that level, but the overall
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policy driver remains at the Community level. The use of expert committees in the legislative process
may produce more enlightened results; nevertheless the process remains largely internalised within
the Community institutions.71 Similarly, the participation of civil actors occurs at the behest of the
institutions72 and is likely to be otherwise limited to those parties with sufficient resources to bully their
way in.
The Community has also engaged with new methods of governance, most notably those labelled
“Social Dialogue” and the “Open Method of Coordination” (“OMC”).73 The “Social Dialogue” approach
makes use of voluntary agreements entered into by recognised representatives of employers *C.J.Q.
236 and employees which can later be enacted by the Council of Ministers.74 The OMC approach
seeks to agree broad policy objectives to be implemented by Member States and establishes means
of sharing good practice and checking progress between the Member States. While both approaches
could be seen as enhancing legitimacy by devolving decision-making closer to those affected, both
occur outside the remit of the European Parliament.75 This weakening of democratic legitimacy76 may
be mitigated in OMC by the subjection of action to scrutiny by domestic systems of review. However,
the Social Dialogue approach may be perceived as a case of the Community giving with one hand
and taking away with the other. It is noteworthy that involvement in the Social Dialogue process has
been considered in the context of Art.230 EC proceedings, the Court of First Instance having
accepted that participation in the process will confer standing on non-privileged applicants.77 It has,
however, limited this by determining that only those participants deemed indispensable to ensuring
effective representation of the parties affected by the Social Dialogue process will be considered as
being individually concerned for the purposes of Art.230 EC.78
While both the development of the “classic” legislative method and the development of new
approaches may have something to offer in terms of adding legitimacy, this is undoubtedly limited to
relatively narrow areas of decision-making. Thus, this new approach cannot wholly address the
broader concerns of democratic deficit. There remains a substantial core of Community activity which
remains locked firmly within the old decision-making processes.
The judicial deficit
Judicial review concerns the “review of the conformity of inferior norms to higher norms deemed to be
at the basis of a political society”.79 The grounds for review set out in Art.230 EC clearly meet this
description, identifying the higher order norms to which the Community must adhere. This is further
underpinned by the Community's commitment in Art.5 EC to act within the authority conferred by the
Treaty.
It is submitted, however, that the Court of Justice's restrictive jurisprudence is incompatible with the
broader purpose of judicial review. The grant of unrestricted standing to the Commission, the Council,
Member States and, eventually and somewhat grudgingly,80 the Parliament, suggests a degree of
covetousness in the allocation of power. The judicial review process thus *C.J.Q. 237 replicates the
legislative process, facilitating the domination of institutional interests at the expense of the citizenry.
This is further emphasised by a tendency for much Art.230 EC litigation to focus on inter-institutional
disputes, rather than individual claims, which again reflects interest group theory. While the
institutions of the Community may rightly be concerned with ensuring that the other institutions act
lawfully, the Community's citizens may perceive this as a case of the foxes guarding the chicken
coop, with the only issue being the allocation of lunch.
If the whole process of judicial review is merely an internal mechanism for the settling of
intra-Community disputes, it cannot provide any substantial degree of democratic legitimacy. While
the systems of checks and balances necessary in a democratic system of government may be
present at a constitutional level, individual participation is largely excluded, yet:
“In a democracy citizens are to have an equal right to participate in and to determine the outcome of
the constitutional and legislative processes which establish the laws with which they are to comply …
Each citizen is to have an equal right to take part in constitutional processes that establish laws and
basic social institutions.”81
The Court of Justice's approach will not provide enhanced democratic legitimacy while it fails to
acknowledge individuals with a special interest in the substance of Community action but who cannot
demonstrate a pronounced demarcation from other potential litigants. In fact, it widens the deficit by
creating a gap between the significant institutional and state interests at the higher level and the
interests of the individual.
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However, it is submitted that this ex post facto judicial method of achieving effective individual
representation at Community level is more appropriate than ex ante legislative involvement.82 First,
the distance between the decisionmaking process and the citizen suggests that the input should
come from those most likely to be impacted upon by a measure, which may not become evident until
after implementation. Secondly, the strong institutional and state interests outlined have the capacity
to substantially restrict individual intervention at a formative stage. Thirdly, in any event, such
intervention would be cumbersome and would be dominated by those with sufficient financial and
political resources to intervene rather than the significantly weaker individual.
Conclusions on the democratic deficit
The Community system has limited citizen participation both ex ante and ex post facto, with a
legislative process of dubious democratic legitimacy and a narrowly focused ex post facto review as
initiated by individuals. The citizen's ability to participate in the constitutional affairs of the Community
and, more importantly for the individual, to protect their own interests, is limited to the election of
MEPs and national government representation; necessarily blunt *C.J.Q. 238 and ineffective
instruments for the resolution of individual complaints concerning specific aspects of Community
action. As a result, Europe's citizenry is largely excluded from the democratic process.
A more inclusive approach to standing under Art.230 EC would enhance the democratic nature of the
Community and could augment trust amongst the populace83 : “An important task of the courts is to
place limits upon governmental activity, but this serves to legitimate government as well as to control
it.” 84 Although the judicial review process is inevitably limited to ensuring the legality of
decision-making, and does not necessarily offer the individual substantial possibilities of a challenge
to the material nature of a measure, greater access for individuals would at least facilitate
participation and enhance that legality. The engagement of a democratically unaccountable judiciary
in the scrutiny of legislation enacted by more representative bodies is not inherently undemocratic85
where the courts are involved in testing the compatibility of such measures as against a higher order
of law such as a constitution or, in the case of the Community, an overriding and authoritative Treaty.
The approach to standing in the Member States
The form of Art.230 EC has been influenced by the systems of judicial review in the Member States,
most notably France.86 However, even a brief analysis of the French system suggests that it permits
significantly greater access to judicial review than under Art.230 EC. When other domestic systems
such as Germany and the United Kingdom are considered, it is evident that despite limiting access to
judicial scrutiny, each nevertheless offers significantly greater opportunities to secure legality and
constitutionality than Art.230 EC. Both French and German systems separate the constitutional and
administrative aspects of review, and these will be examined separately before considering the
English system.
Constitutional review
Under French constitutional law, the Conseil Constitutionnel is required to scrutinise all lois
organiques, laws affecting the interrelationship of the primary actors in the constitution, and declare
their constitutionality prior to enaction.87 Ordinary laws, lois ordinaries, are not automatically subject to
scrutiny, but may be scrutinised by the Conseil at the behest of any one of the President *C.J.Q. 239
of the Republic, the Prime Minister, the President of the National Assembly, the President of the
Senate, 60 deputies (members of the National Assembly) or 60 senators.88 The exclusion of the right
of individual suit is not as problematic as in the EU context, both because of the relative proximity of
the legislative process to the citizen at a domestic level and the role of the Conseil. The relative ease
with which this role can be activated, and its mandatory nature in relation to the most important
legislation, suggests a much more robust system of constitutional review than operated under Art.230
EC, which gives no such role to the Community courts.
German public law has no equivalent of the Conseil to act in an advisory capacity prior to the
enactment of legislation. The Grundgesetz provides for the direct right of individual complaint to the
Bundesverfassungsgericht where a breach of basic rights is alleged.89 The claimant will have locus
standi if they personally suffer a detriment as a direct consequence of unconstitutional state activity, a
significantly lower threshold than that utilised by the Court of Justice. Although even this threshold
makes it unlikely that individuals will be able to challenge statutes directly, it will usually allow them to
challenge a judicial or administrative decision and thus contest the constitutionality of the statute
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indirectly. The Grundgesetz also provides for ordinary courts to make a reference to the
Bundesverfassungsgericht where the constitutionality of a statute arises in the course of proceedings
between parties.90
Administrative review
Both German and French public law operate a system of administrative review below the highest
constitutional level. The French system of Droit Administratif, which has otherwise contributed much
to the Art.230 EC procedure,91 is considerably more liberal in its approach to standing than Art.230
EC as interpreted by the Court of Justice. Droit Administratif requires only that the applicant should be
able to demonstrate that the decision subject to review is detrimental to their good. Though the
Conseil d'Etat has placed some limitations upon the ability of individuals to challenge administrative
action and refuted a general right to bring suit, it has accepted that a collective interest may be
sufficient.92 It has tended to focus on the level of impact upon the individual in according standing,
rather than attempting to delineate the applicant from all others.93
German law also operates a second tier of review of administrative decision making where questions
of constitutionality do not arise. Here, too, the process requires an individual to demonstrate the
violation of a legally protected *C.J.Q. 240 interest (see above). However, the approach is narrower
than that adopted under Droit Administratif as it does not allow collective actions.94
The English approach
Despite the superficial similarity between Art.230 EC and English judicial review, neither of which
distinguish between constitutional and administrative review, it is submitted that English law is more
liberal in allowing individual access to the higher order norms (i.e. Acts of Parliament) in the
constitution. The claimant must have a “sufficient interest in the matter to which the application
relates”,95 and it can be argued that access to higher order norms has been further facilitated by the
enaction of “constitutional statutes” such as the European Communities Act 1972 and Human Rights
Act 1998.96 This liberal approach has even extended to allowing public-interest groups to bring
actions. In this regard, and also in relation to individuals, the English approach has extended standing
where the matters might not otherwise be brought before a court but are deemed to be of importance.
97
Conclusions on Member State approaches
It is submitted that judicial review at Community level should be made at least as effective as at
national level. The relative distance of Community legislative and administrative procedures from the
citizen means that review is arguably more important at Community level, yet the opportunities for
individuals to engage the mechanism are less.
The requirements of fundamental rights
It is submitted that the current approach of the Community courts to individual standing under Art.230
EC contravenes the rights to an effective remedy98 and a fair hearing99 developed by those courts and
enshrined in Art.47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (the Charter).
However, there are currently two difficulties in attempting to use them as grounds for widening access
to justice under Art.230 EC. First, the Charter is not legally binding.100 The rights contained in it
therefore have no *C.J.Q. 241 direct legal effect101 and, while the Commission does examine
proposals for legislation and other measures for compliance with the Charter,102 it has generally been
taken into account by the Community courts only as a reaffirmation of existing rights.103 However,
Art.I-7 and Pt II of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe provide for the Charter to be
incorporated into the Treaties and to have binding legal effect,104 which would remove this objection to
reliance on Art.47 if and when the Treaty comes into force.
The second difficulty is that although the Court of First Instance in Jégo-Quéré interpreted the right to
an effective remedy as requiring an extension of the Art.230 EC locus standi requirements,105 the
Court of Justice did not. Nor is the Charter, even if it acquires the status of law, likely to be of
assistance in widening the scope of the rights to a fair trial and an effective remedy. In UPA Advocate
General Jacobs relied on it as merely a reaffirmation of the right to an effective remedy,106 and
although Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo strongly argued in Aalborg Portland A/S and others v
Commission that the Charter extended the scope of the right to a fair trial (to include the right of
persons to be heard by the institutions of the EU prior to the taking of any individual measure which
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could affect them adversely, and the right of access to their file),107 the Court of Justice did not adopt
this argument.108
An argument that the rights to a fair trial and an effective remedy require persons adversely affected
by Community law to have the right to challenge it may, however, derive support from the
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights. In Osman v United Kingdom, that court ruled
that although the right to institute proceedings was not absolute, “limitations applied [must] not restrict
or reduce the access left to the individual in such a way or to such an extent that the very essence of
the right is impaired”.109 Unfortunately, while the Court of Justice has drawn on the European
Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”)110 to establish, inter alia, the rights to a fair hearing and a
legal remedy, it has not always interpreted the scope of ECHR-derived rights in line with the
European Court of Human Rights.111 However, Art.I-7 of the Treaty *C.J.Q. 242 establishing a
Constitution for Europe gives the EU competence to accede to the ECHR and this may lead to a
convergence of the jurisprudence.112
A further possible solution is an action before the European Court of Human Rights. In Matthews v
United Kingdom 113 that court upheld a challenge to the legality of an Act annexed to Dec.63/787, on
the grounds that the transfer of powers to an international organisation such as the EU was
compatible with the ECHR only if fundamental rights were protected. Since the decision and the Act
constituted a Treaty, and therefore did not give rise to the possibility of a legal challenge before the
Court of Justice, the Member States remained responsible for this protection. They entered into
Treaties freely and could not argue that the responsibility for the protection of rights was beyond their
control. However, this development would appear to be limited to the Treaties, because the Court of
Justice has jurisdiction to review most secondary legislation, at least on the application of privileged
applicants.
Conclusion
It has been argued above that the restrictions on the standing of non-privileged applicants imposed by
the court are both inconsistent and in appropriate. It is therefore submitted that Art.230 EC should be
interpreted not merely more liberally, but more consistently so, than hitherto.
A proposed new approach to direct concern
First, even where the Community grants discretion to the national authorities to implement Community
policy, a challenge to the underlying Community law should still be admissible. It is not the
subsequent national law which is the source of the invalidity, but the Community law. Indeed, national
courts may suspend national law based on allegedly invalid Community law pending an Art.234 EC
ruling on the latter from the Court of Justice.114
The court has recognised that the existence of discretion in the legislation should not preclude a
claim,115 and on this basis it is submitted that a claim should not be debarred merely because the
discretion is exercised after, rather than before, the Community measure is adopted. It is proposed
that an *C.J.Q. 243 applicant should be directly concerned unless any discretion allowed to the
Member State is so wide as to a material extent to break the chain of causation between the
Community measure and its impact on the applicant. It would be inappropriate were an illegal
measure to be immune from challenge by nonprivileged applicants merely because a Member State
retained a limited discretion in implementation.
A proposed new approach to individual concern
Secondly, an applicant whose legal position is substantially--in the sense of exceeding normal
economic risks--affected by a measure should be regarded as being individually concerned. This
would better serve the interests of justice than the tests currently applied, while preventing frivolous
actions. Support for such an approach comes from both UPA and Jégo-Quéré, albeit from the
Advocate General and the Court of First Instance rather than the Court of Justice. In UPA, Advocate
General Jacobs argued that, in order to provide adequate judicial protection of persons affected by
Community measures, a person should be regarded as individually concerned where “by reason of
his particular circumstances, the measure has, or is liable to have, a substantial adverse effect on his
interests”.116 Subsequently, the Court of First Instance in Jégo-Quéré concluded that it was not
necessary to interpret individual concern as requiring that an applicant seeking to challenge a general
measure be differentiated from all others affected by it in the same way as an addressee. It would be
sufficient if,
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“the measure in question affects [the applicant's] legal position, in a manner which is both definite and
immediate, by restricting [his] rights or by imposing obligations on him. The number and position of
other persons who are likewise affected by the measure, or who may be so, are of no relevance in
that regard”.117
Precedent for such a development can also be found in the jurisprudence of the Community courts.
As discussed above, they have interpreted Art.230 EC to include types of measure omitted from that
article,118 and they have also interpreted it as including applicants omitted from Art.230 EC. In
Parliament v Council (Chernobyl) 119 the Court of Justice permitted judicial review by the Parliament,
despite the absence in Art.230 EC of any reference to the Parliament and its own confirmation less
than two years previously in Parliament v Council (Comitology) 120 that Parliament had no locus
standi. In Chernobyl, the court held that the Parliament had locus standi in order to protect its
prerogatives, on the ground that alternative legal remedies, such as Art.232 EC (challenges to failures
to act), Art.234 EC, and the Commission's duty to ensure Parliament's prerogatives were respected,
were inadequate to guarantee *C.J.Q. 244 review of a measure adopted in disregard of these
prerogatives. Locus standi under Art.230 EC was therefore essential to the maintenance of the
institutional balance.121 These arguments are remarkably similar to those advanced by the Court of
First Instance in Jégo-Quéré and Advocate General Jacobs in UPA, that is to say, that individual
access to justice would only be maintained if individuals were permitted to challenge measures which
substantially adversely affected their interests. However, this parallel was not recognised--or at least
not admitted--by the court which, as has been seen,122 expressly stated that a new interpretation of
Art.230 EC could only result from a change to its text by the Member States. The meaning ascribed to
the concept of individual concern by the courts therefore should, and could, encompass an applicant
whose legal position is substantially and immediately affected by a measure.
Advantages of a new approach
Access to justice
As the Court of Justice accepted in UPA, the Community is based on the rule of law, and its
institutions must therefore be subject to judicial review of the compatibility of their acts with the EC
Treaty and with general principles of law, including the fundamental right to judicial protection.
Interpreting the concept of locus standi more widely would increase access to justice and therefore
the effectiveness of Community law.
Coherence in the law
The more generous approach outlined above would be consistent with the Community courts'
approach to access to justice at Member State level, and with their recognition of the principle of
proportionality123 which, it is submitted, requires that restrictions on standing needed to ensure legal
certainty and deter frivolous litigation do not prevent genuine claims being heard.124
The new approach would also provide a single coherent test,125 and would be consistent with the
wording of Art.230 EC. For example, in Extramet Industrie v Council, 126 an importer was permitted to
challenge a regulation imposing an anti-dumping duty, because it was the largest importer in the
Community, the end-user of the product, and economically dependent on imports since the only
Community supplier was its main competitor and unwilling to supply it. It could be said that the
regulation had substantially and immediately affected its rights by effectively requiring it to pay the
duty. Similarly, in Codornui v *C.J.Q. 245 Council, 127 the rights of the Spanish wine-producer which
had used the term “crémant” for decades could have been said to be substantially and immediately
restricted by a regulation which reserved use of the term to certain other wines.
A more generous approach would also see the development of greater consistency and coherency
across the Court of Justice's jurisprudence and between judicial review at Member State level and at
Community level.
Democratic issues
The adoption of the new approach proposed here would narrow the democratic deficit in the
Community. Currently, the citizen is removed from the Community's decision-making processes
because of the nature of the institutional structure. Providing greater access for individuals to the
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judicial decision-making process would do much to resolve this problem and engage the citizen in the
Community project.
Disadvantages of a new approach
The only real disadvantage of a more generous approach to locus standi is that it would increase the
number of admissible actions, and thus the workload of the Community courts and delays in the
process. However, it is submitted that justice delayed for all is preferable to justice denied for the
many.
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